Categories
读书有感

Constitutional Law by Yale 听课笔记(四)

这门课真的是超级耗精力,video很长,还有很多资料要查,还得写很长的assignment...勉强跟着,多少有点力不从心了...好在结束了。

笔记零零散散的,更多是边写作业边查资料所得。这门课后半部分,professor Akhil Reed Amar 主要是在讲unwritten Constitution,就是说那些历史啊典故啊什么的,虽然没有具体写在宪法的8000字里面,但是还是彰显着宪法的精神和光辉的。大致的框架和可以从Amar的这本书里面看出来:

America’s Unwritten Constitution : The Precedents and Principles We Live By.

书可以在amazon上搜到,不过我看到一篇书评还蛮好的,很提纲挈领的总结了一番。抄一下:

  • The Enacted Constitution: Amar undermines the constitutional text by trying to demonstrate that we don’t actually know what the “official” version says anyway. And he goes on about “the Year of our Lord” about five times longer than one might have thought possible, debating with himself about whether that reference in the Constitution collides with the First Amendment.
  • The Implicit Constitution: Amar relies mostly on the predicate-act canon and the whole-text canon. The duty to do X includes the authority to do Y if Y is necessary to carry out X. On the whole, he stands on pretty firm ground here.
  • The Lived Constitution: You have a constitutional right “to have a pet dog, to play the fiddle, to relax at home, to enjoy family life with your loved ones, to raise your children, to wear a hat.” You get the idea. So how do you enforce your warm and cuddly constitutional right to “enjoy family life with your loved ones”? Amar doesn’t say.
  • The Warrented Constitution (that’s not a misspelling but a lame pun in homage to Chief Justice Earl Warren): The Warren Court (1953-1969) honored the “spirit” of the Constitution (and the letter, too, Amar argues unconvincingly). The Warren Court, of course, represented the official unmooring of constitutional law from the words of the document that the Court was supposed to be “interpreting.”
  • The Doctrinal Constitution: Amar asserts that Roe v. Wade was correct because it was “rights-expanding”: he argues that “a case that construes a textual constitutional right too narrowly is different from one that construes the right too broadly. Even if both cases come to be widely embraced by the citizenry, only the rights-expanding case interacts with the text of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments so as to specially immunize it from subsequent reversal.”
  • The Symbolic Constitution: “The most important thing to understand about America’s symbolic Constitution is simply that it exists, Amar writes:

Americans of all stripes can easily name certain texts that stand outside the confines of the written Constitution yet operate in American constitutional discourse as privileged sources of meaning, inspiration, and guidance. True, once we move beyond this core set of texts, the outer boundaries of the canon are fuzzy.

   Amar’s examples: the Gettysburg Address and Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech.

  • The Feminist Constitution: In Amar’s view, all law relating to women was undermined by women’s suffrage: “under an entirely plausible vision of America’s unwritten feminist Constitution, judges soon after 1920 could have held that laws such as these [relating to contraception and abortion] were valid only if reenacted by a legislature elected by women voting equally alongside men. As for these laws, perhaps judges should have wiped the legal slate clean in 1920, by striking down the old laws and thereby obliging states to put the matter to a fresh vote.” To quote this is to refute it.
  • The Georgian Constitution (the name is based on that of George Washington): This chapter is mostly padding based on George Washington’s presidential (and precedential) actions. Perhaps it was intended to relieve traditionalists after the unreality of the preceding chapter.
  • The Institutional Constitution: Again, this is padding for traditionalists. “[P]ost-1789 institutional practice thus furnishes a powerful lens through which to read the 1789 blueprint.”
  • The Partisan Constitution: “Most of the rules and roles textually delineated in the original Constitution — for House members, senators, department heads, vice presidents, members of the electoral college, and so on — must today be reread through the prism of America’s two-party system.” But why?
  • The Conscientious Constitution: Here we get to the personal preferences of judges: “[T]here is a proper place for conscience — a concept that forms part of the necessary, albeit unwritten, substratum of American constitutionalism.” If you’re a judge, follow your bliss.
  • The Unfinished Constitution: This is the great morphing Constitution that is “still to be written, the hoped?for Constitution of 2020 — and of 2121 and 2222.” This constitutional morphing is our “constitutional donation.” Amar’s doubt about it is confirmed in his use of surely: “Though this [donation] does not reside on the clear surface of any explicit constitutional text, surely it forms an integral part of America’s unwritten Constitution.”

实在是每一节都很长...各种历史背景事件来龙去脉这样,读起来蛮累的。我个人印象比较深的是乔治华盛顿,比如他的言行举止言传身教确立了很多传统;然后就是一些彰显人文精神和时代光辉的文字演讲,比如大家耳熟能详的I have a dream;最后就是美国法院习惯的 stare decisis 即“遵循先例”,各种案例比如为什么现在是一人一票这样。宪法修正案也有很多故事什么的,学法律的过程除了看条文本身还要熟知很多cases,好累。我的理解是,法律是一个社会的规范条文,所以这东西不是证实或者证伪这么简单,理解法律除了需要抽丝剥茧之外,还考验人的综合和联想能力。一句话,费时的熟练工种...

虽然我是三天打鱼两天晒网,deadline之前奋力突击类型的,但是真的从这门课学到了很多东西。理解一个社会制度远远比理解一个数理模型难的多...所以宪法学起来其实比税法之类的经济法难很多,就像以前常说的一句话,经济学家考虑的更多是效率而非公平(efficiency > fairness),而法学家考虑的是社会整体的诉求和运转规则。出发点完全是不一样的。利益分析简单,而情理分析就好难。

Categories
事儿关经济

从经济决策参与看中国法治进步

今天下午去听了一个学术讲座,是张昕竹博士(中国社科院规制与竞争研究中心主任)主讲的。依照惯例,先贴一些他的简介(来自:http://iqte.cass.cn/iqteweb_old/xzjs/zxz.htm

毕业院校:厦门大学、上海交通大学、法国图鲁兹大学(师从Jean-Jacques Laffont,让﹒雅克﹒拉丰,新规制经济学创始人之一,哈佛大学经济学博士(Wells奖得主)。
中文简介:http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/%E6%8B%89%E4%B8%B0
学  位:博  士
职  称:研究员
职  务:数量经济与技术经济研究所所长助理、数量金融研究室主任、 院规制与竞争研 究中心主任
社会职务:《电信法》起草专家咨询委员会成员、国家信息化专家咨询委员会成员、国务院行政审批
         改革专家咨询小组成员
研究领域:规制经济学
主要成果:
  《网络产业的规制与竞争》(合著),社科文献出版社2000
  《中国规制与竞争:理论和政策》(主编),社科文献出版社2000
   “景区管理体制与改革”(论文,合作),《比较经济和社会体制》2001年第8期
  “激励管制与电信改革”(论文)《通讯世界》2001年10月号
  “WTO与电信监管改革”(论文),《财经》2001年11月号
  “论风景名胜区的政府规制”(论文),《社会经济体制比较》2002年2月号
  “风景名胜区的规制改革”(论文),《中国园林》2002年第2期
  “论基础设施产业重组”(论文),《中国铁路》2002年4月号
 

今天下午本来只是无聊想去听听讲座,没想到碰到了这么厉害的一个研究员。和昨儿上午听的讲座完全不一样,这真是能让人感受到深刻和内涵的讲座。

讲座是有关反垄断法——企业并购申报制度的经济学分析。他讲的非常好,是关于他们制定反垄断法申报标准的研究过程的。具体的细节在此不多多赘述了,我自己还有很多要去思考的地方。比如要好好读读《政府采购与规制中的激砺理论》和《激厉理论:委托一代理模型》,还好这两本书图书馆都有收藏。

我想说的是一个细节:这大概是少有的中国法律的制定需要经济学专家来参与决策和分析。可能也和反垄断法太密切的和经济相关的缘故,这大概是法经济学这么多年来在中国取得的少有的认可和实用体现。我们在学习税法和经济法的时候总是感觉到中国现行法律制度的种种缺陷,但大都归结为体制缘故——制定法律的程序等等,却不曾在制定这个过程中过多的听到经济学家的声音。但是现在不同了,越来越多的法律牵扯到经济利益,故而越来越多的追求“帕累托最优”的经济学分析开始加入。

诚如张博士所说,现在广为在IO(产业组织)领域应用的就是Game Theory和micro-econometrics ,这是现在国外经济学领域研究的热点。国内这方面的学者也越来越多。法经济学现在感觉被炒得有些热,可能是和中国经济快速发展需要相应的法制健全有关吧。

在越来越多的场合听到经济学家的声音,尤其是在媒体上,这我们已经司空见惯了。但是真正的经济分析尤其是微观分析作为一个制定法律的参照,这不得不说中国的法制建设在不断进步。虽然我们看到还是有很多东西需要国务院而不是人代会通过和发布,但是相信随着经济的稳定,以后的法律制度会越来越稳健。毕竟我们说,法律的朝令夕改对于经济来说并不是一件好事儿。

但是话说回来,像新劳动法那般的法律,都把中国的企业折腾的破产了,领先时代二十年又有什么用?那么以后在发布之前,可不可以有更多的经济分析而不是单纯的法律分析和政治分析呢?期待新的保险法颁布的时候,会看到中国法制建设越来越成熟的一面。