落园 » 主观评价与薪酬设计|专注经济视角下的互联网

主观评价与薪酬设计

本来心情大好的,在这一期AEJ:micro中拎出来两篇papers,准备好好研读的。第一篇关于online marketing的还好,长长的日志已经发出来了。但是这第二篇...我怎么选了一篇TSE(Toulouse School of Economics)的文章呢?自讨苦吃。

题目蛮诱人的,尤其对我这种热衷于机制设计游戏的孩子来说。

Maestri, Lucas. 2012. "Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4(3): 34–56.

什么主观评价体系啊(原来都是看客观评价的),奖金激励啊,有效工资啊,重复PA博弈啊,看起来多么实际的劳动市场机制设计问题啊。然后呢?看到1/2处,我已经忍无可忍了。假设,也太多了吧。各种陈述,各种规则,各种各种最后得出来一些不怎么强的结论。耐着性子推了1/3的公式之后,终于忍无可忍了,直接扫文字,最后跳到conclusion了。

米有意思,大大的米有意思。Too economics to enjoy. 还是喜欢直觉比较强的文章,虽然某种程度上公式是逃不掉的。只是感觉,不够elegent吧。

我不知道应不应该复制一下conclusion,还是复制一下abstract吧。

We study an infinitely repeated principal-agent model with subjective evaluations. We compare the surplus in efficiency-wage equilibria and in bonus-payments equilibria. The agent receives a constant wage and is motivated by the threat of dismissal in efficiency-wage equilibria. The agent receives a bonus and quits the relationship after disagreements between his self-evaluation and the principal's performance appraisal in bonus-payments equilibria. We construct a class of equilibria with bonus payments that approach efficiency as patience increases. In contrast, payoffs from efficiency-wage equilibria are bounded away from the Pareto-payoff frontier for any discount factor.

让我对这篇paper没那么大耐心的另外一个原因是,新一期的Journal of Economic Perspectives也出了,还有一两篇有意思的paper可以读(尤其是一篇两个在业界的研究者搞出来的paper)。只是在这里简单记录一下好了。对TSE的风格,真的是让人越来越不喜欢了(虽然曾几何时,Laffont的那本书几乎成为桌案圣经...)。希望不是我开始越来越浮躁了吧?


Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *